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Abstract: 
This paper investigates how the transparency of decision-making affects preferences over 
distributional outcomes. We also examine what motivates individuals to voluntarily invest 
economic resources to monitor decision-making processes. We find that third-party monitoring 
does not affect distributional outcomes in a three-person ultimatum game. Our results show that a 
large majority of individuals is willing to pay for a right to monitor decision-making processes 
despite pecuniary incentives to the contrary. We observe that third-parties are over-confident in 
believing that an opportunity to scrutinize decision-making processes changes distributional 
outcomes for their own benefit. Our results suggest that people may over-estimate the effect of 
transparent decision-making on economic outcomes.    
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I. Introduction 
Many economic and political decisions are made either in transparent or secretive circumstances. 
We regularly observe political, legal and private disputes over citizens’ rights to monitor 
decision-making processes. Historically, influential political movements have been launched 
aiming to increase the transparency of political and economic decision-making by granting 
citizens access to government records and decision-making venues to monitor political decision-
making processes.
1
 Currently, the emergence of modern information technologies, particularly 
the Internet and social media, is changing the traditional landscape of governance, management 
and negotiations by fuelling even greater public demand for more transparent decision-making.
2
  
 
This paper experimentally investigates how the knowledge of being under surveillance during a 
negotiation process influences preferences over distributional outcomes. We also examine what 
motivates individuals to voluntarily invest economic resources to monitor decision-making 
processes. Laboratory experiments provide a controlled environment where these questions can 
be studied. In particular, our experiment renders it possible to investigate how the knowledge of 
being under surveillance influences resource allocation through bargaining and whether people 
have an intrinsic motivation to observe bargaining processes that determine distributional 
outcomes.  
 
Scientific interest in the influence of surveillance on human behavior is not new. The well-known 
illumination experiments with a modest aim to measure the impact of factory lighting on worker 
productivity at the Hawthorne Works between 1924 and 1932 turned out to be a landmark event 
in the development of social sciences (Mayo, 1933). The later re-analysis of these experiments let 
Henry A. Landsberger (1958) to coin the term “Hawthorne effect” to describe a phenomenon that 
occurs when individuals alter their behavior due to the feeling that they are under surveillance or 
                                                             
1 There is a long history of demanding unimpeded public access to government documents. Sweden was probably the 
first country to adopt laws granting all citizens unrestricted access to government documents which were not deemed 
particularly confidential. These laws were adopted in Sweden in 1776. 
2 There have traditionally been differences in access to government documents. For instance, while the Federal 
Reserve Open Market Committee and the US Supreme Court have for long published their minutes and released the 
votes of individual committee members, the views of the individual members of the Governing Council of the 
European Central Bank and the EU Court of Justice have typically not been publicly accessible. The European 
Central Bank published the minutes of a governing council meeting for the first time on February 19, 2015. 
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given indirect attention by measuring their performance.
3
 The experiments at the Hawthorne 
Works not only laid a foundation for studies that focus on the effects of scrutiny on human 
behavior but also provide important guidance on how to develop new experimental practices to 
avoid the fate of the original Hawthorne experiments.  
 
An important contribution of the original Hawthorne experiments and the follow-up studies has 
been the insight that scrutiny may alter subjects’ behavior in behavioral experiments. This 
knowledge has sensitized researchers to develop research methodologies that enable them to 
control for confounds due to experimental demand effects. A related issue often raised in the 
literature pertains to the external validity of laboratory experiments conducted under the 
surveillance of the experimenter. Hence, Levitt and List (2007) mention the scrutiny associated 
with participation in economic experiments as one of the greatest threats to the external validity 
of economic experiments.  
 
This paper connects to a voluminous literature studying the importance of social structure on 
economic behavior. Social identity and social distance between agents are known to influence 
preferences for redistribution both in experimental investigations (Hoffman et al., 1996; Klor and 
Shayo, 2010) and naturally-occurring situations (Alesina and Giuliano, 2009). In particular, 
experimental evidence indicates that reduced social distance by different means such as knowing 
the other person’s name (Charness and Gneezy, 2008) and seeing the other person’s picture 
(Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Eckel and Petrie, 2011) increase the salience of other-regarding 
concerns in economic decision-making. Likewise, people are known to behave more pro-socially 
when their decisions are observable to their teammates (Cason and Mui, 1997). In addition to the 
literature documenting the effects of social distance on economic behavior between two directly 
involved parties, there is substantial evidence showing that third-parties whose economic 
outcome is not directly affected by a norm violation are willing to alter distributional outcomes at 
their own cost (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). Furthermore, it appears that the strength of third-
party punishment is proportional to the size of the pay-off inequality between the individuals and 
can largely be explained by other-regarding motivations (Leibbrandt and Lopez-Perez, 2012). 
                                                             
3 There is persistent interest in the original Hawthorne data leading to several attempts to re-analyse and reinterpret 
the original data. Levitt and List (2011) suggest in a recent contribution that the original interpretation of the data is 
likely to be fictional due to deficiencies in the experimental design.  
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Recent research has established that the relationship between distributional outcomes and social 
distance is sensitive to low-level cues. Pro-social behavior towards anonymous recipients and 
contributions to public goods are known to increase under watching eyes (Bateson et al., 2006). 
In the same vein, Haley and Fessler (2005), Burnham and Hare (2007) and Rigdon et al. (2009) 
report experimental results indicating that the presence of subtle eye-like stimuli guides choice 
behavior towards more generous allocations.
4
 Drawing on the extensive evidence suggesting the 
importance of social distance on human behavior, our study examines the role of third-party 
monitoring as a means to reduce social distance between the decision-makers and an inactive 
third-party.   
 
Communication between agents is known to play a pivotal role in economic bargaining and 
strategic interaction. One of the most conspicuous results in the experimental literature is that 
pre-play communication between the actors enhances cooperativeness and equalizes 
distributional outcomes (Isaac and Walker, 1988; Ostrom et al., 1994; Ledyard, 1995). This has 
in turn led to important refinements of economic theory showing that the dissemination of 
information about players’ preferences and intentions increases the likelihood of establishing 
stable agreements among independent decision-makers (Rabin, 1994; Farrell, 1995; Crawford, 
1998). However, very little is known about the influence of third-party surveillance on the 
diffusion of information between individuals and the contents of pre-play communication. Even 
though there is no prior evidence directly showing that third-party surveillance alters the contents 
of communication, it can be hypothesized that third-party surveillance diminishes the 
effectiveness of communication to facilitate economic coordination and cooperation by inhibiting 
individuals’ willingness to reveal their preferences and intentions.5 
 
                                                             
4
 The study by Haley and Fessler (2005) has led to several follow-up studies examining the robustness of the 
watching eyes effect. For example, Raihani and Bshary (2012) report no watching eyes effect in the Dictator Game. 
Fehr and Schneider (2010) report no effect in the Trust Game. Nettle et al. (2013) conduct a meta-analysis of the 
studies of the watching eyes effect in Dictator Game experiments published to date and conclude that the effect is 
robust. However, they suggest that instead of making people directionally more generous, watching eyes primarily 
reduce variation in social behavior.  
5 Brosig et al. (2003) observe that the communication medium influences both the level and the stability of 
cooperation in a public goods game, even though the contents of communication are not influenced by the 
communication medium. Oprea et al. (2014) show that the effectiveness of communication as a coordination device 
depends on the richness of the message space. While these studies do not directly investigate the influence of third-
party surveillance on the effectiveness of communication, they suggest that the richness of communication may 
impact the effectiveness of interpersonal communication to facilitate economic coordination and cooperation. 
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We use a three-person ultimatum game as a workhorse to investigate the effects of transparency 
on bargaining behavior and distributional preferences. The game provides an ideal environment 
to study the effects of third-party monitoring as it consists of a very simple bargaining scenario 
with an inactive third-party whose payoff is affected by the bargaining outcome. The innovation 
of this paper is to endow the third-party with a right to observe other participants’ pre-play 
communication. This allows us to examine whether the knowledge of being under third-party 
surveillance during a pre-play communication stage increases proposed allocations to third-
parties. In addition, we implement three treatments which offer opportunities to purchase 
surveillance rights. Our design renders it possible to estimate the demand for a right to observe 
decision-making processes in the absence of participation rights in the actual decision-making 
process. Furthermore, treatments, which vary the information given to the negotiators about the 
presence of third-parties, enable us to distinguish strategically motivated purchasing decisions 
from an intrinsic motivation to acquire a right to observe the negotiations.  
 
Our results show that the monitoring of decision-making processes by third-parties does not 
influence distributional outcomes in a three-person ultimatum game. At the same time, we find 
that a large majority of individuals is willing to pay for a right to monitor decision-making 
processes despite pecuniary incentives to the contrary. We observe that individuals in our 
experiment are over-confident in believing that an opportunity to monitor decision-making 
processes changes distributional outcomes for their own benefit. As a result, offering third-parties 
an opportunity to buy a right to monitor decision-making processes in a three-player ultimatum 
game increases disadvantageous pay-off inequality between the third-parties and other 
individuals. Overall, our results suggest that people may over-estimate the effect of transparent 
decision-making on economic outcomes. Economic theory may need to account for these 
behavioral characteristics to explain the rationale behind the persistent demands for more 
transparent economic and political decision-making.   
 
II. Experimental Design and Behavioral Predictions 
2.1 Experimental Design  
In this study, individuals play a one-shot three-player ultimatum bargaining game (Güth and van 
Damme, 1998). A proposer is endowed with 29 Experimental Currency Units (ECUs) which need 
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to be divided among the proposer, a responder and an inactive third-party.
6
 The proposer makes 
an offer of a split of the 29 ECUs among the three parties. Thereafter, the responder decides 
whether to accept the offer as proposed. If the proposer’s offer is accepted by the responder, the 
offer is implemented and players’ earnings are according to the proposal. If the offer is rejected 
by the responder, all players have zero earnings. The rules of the game specify that the proposals 
are to be made in integers. Assignment to different roles is random and performed at the 
beginning of the experiment.  
Before the proposal is made, the responder and proposer are given an opportunity to 
communicate with each other. The communication takes place by exchanging written messages 
in a computerized chat for a maximum time of 180 seconds. This open-ended communication 
between the proposer and responder allows negotiating a mutually agreeable outcome that may 
diminish the likelihood of rejected proposals. However, open-ended communication also enables 
players to develop negotiation strategies and pose threats aiming to maximize individual 
earnings. The use of a controlled laboratory experiment renders it possible to preserve full 
anonymity among the participants and isolate the effect of mere textual exchange of messages 
from visual or verbal cues such as vocal intonation, facial expressions and body language. We do 
not limit the content of the communication between the participants by any means except for 
restrictions against revealing one’s true identity, usage of insulting language and threats or offers 
of side-payments that take place outside of the experimental laboratory. Even though 
concentration on written communication may seem a limitation of the study, it is worth 
mentioning that several potential applications of this study comprise of situations where the 
negotiation process is documented in a written form. Some illustrative examples of 
communication between participants are shown in the Electronic Supplementary Material (ESM). 
These examples also show the type of information that third-parties can observe if they have a 
right to monitor the discussion.  
This study includes data from experimental sessions conducted in Germany (Max Planck Institute 
of Economics, Jena) and the United Kingdom (University of East Anglia, Norwich). There are 
five different treatments in this study. Common to every treatment is the three-player ultimatum 
                                                             
6The endowment of 29 ECUs removes the option of equal two-way split between the proposer and responder and the 
option of equal three-way split between all players. We chose this endowment size to avoid the implementation of 
regularly observed equal splits to achieve greater variance in behavioral outcomes and the contents of the 
communication. 
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bargaining game and the communication stage prior to the game. In treatment Baseline, inactive 
third-parties do not observe the course of negotiations between the proposer and responder. In 
treatment Observation, inactive third-parties are able to observe the communication between the 
proposer and responder. In Observation, the proposer and responder know that the bargaining 
takes place under third-party surveillance. In treatment Purchase, inactive third-parties are given 
an option to purchase a right to observe the course of negotiations. In treatment Purchase-other, 
inactive third-parties are given an option to purchase a right to observe the course of negotiations 
between some other proposer and responder than the proposer and responder who determine their 
payoff. In both Purchase and Purchase-other, the proposer and responder are aware that a third-
party can potentially observe their discussion but are not informed about actual third-party 
presence during the negotiations. In treatment Signal, inactive third-parties are given an option to 
purchase a right to observe the course of negotiations. In this treatment, the proposer and 
responder are informed whether a third-party is monitoring the course of negotiations before 
beginning the communication phase. Table 1 summarizes the five treatments. 
 
Table 1. Experimental Treatments. 
Treatment Third-party 
observes 
negotiation 
Third-party may 
buy a right to 
monitor the 
negotiation 
Negotiators 
know whether 
third-party is 
observing 
Location N. of 
groups 
Baseline No No Yes G / UK 16 / 15 
Observation Yes No Yes G 25 
Purchase Endogenous Yes No G / UK 17 /14 
Purchase-other Endogenous Yes No UK 17 
Signal Endogenous Yes Yes G 24 
Note: G = Germany, UK = United Kingdom 
 
In treatments Purchase, Purchase-other and Signal, where third-parties have an option to 
purchase a right to monitor the negotiations, we elicit individuals’ willingness to pay for a right to 
monitor by applying a variant of the random price mechanism (Becker et al., 1964). Third-parties 
must decide for an array of prices if they will take the offered money and forego a right to 
observe the negotiations, or forego the money and gain a right to observe. After the third-parties 
have made their decision for each price, the computer draws a random price. If this random price 
is smaller than or equal to the individual’s stated willingness to pay, the individual foregoes the 
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money and gains a right to observe. If the random price is larger than the stated willingness to 
pay, the individual receives a sum of money equal to the random draw and does not observe the 
negotiation process. The prices are 0 ECU, 0.20 ECUs, 0.50 ECUs, 1 ECU, 2 ECUs, 3 ECUs, 4 
ECUs and 5 ECUs.
7
      
In all treatments, individuals acting as third-parties are requested to report their expectations 
about the bargaining outcome. This elicitation of individuals’ expectations renders it possible to 
assess whether greater transparency through a right to monitor the negotiation process affects 
individuals’ expectations about distributional outcomes. In treatments conducted in the UK 
(treatments Purchase and Purchase-other), we also elicit the beliefs of the proposer and 
responder about the third-parties’ willingness to pay for a right to monitor the negotiations.8 This 
practice renders it possible to examine whether individuals’ expectations about the presence of a 
third-party are associated with distributional outcomes. Moreover, eliciting individuals’ 
expectations about a third-party presence in treatments Purchase and Purchase-other enables us 
to study whether individuals expect that third-parties’ willingness to pay for a right to monitor the 
negotiations differs between these treatments.  
We reward accurate expectations by paying a bonus based on deviations from the observed 
distributional outcome and expressed maximum willingness to pay. The maximum reward in the 
case an individual manages to forecast the exact distributional outcome is 5 ECUs. The maximum 
reward in the case an individual manages to forecast the exact maximum willingness to pay is 2 
                                                             
7 Prior research has shown the susceptibility of the random price mechanism to several potential problems that may 
bias the estimation of revealed valuations. These problems include at least the construction of price lists and many 
practical issues related to explaining the logic of the mechanism to experimental subjects. Notably, a specific price 
list may create an anchor which influences the stated willingness to pay. Here we are not interested to estimate 
subjects’ valuations for a right to observe as such, but draw relative results about subjects’ purchasing behavior in 
different treatments. We use the same price list in treatments conducted in Germany and in the UK. All prices are in 
Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). ECUs are converted to Euro and Pounds at an exchange rate of 1:1. 
8 The fact that we elicit the beliefs of the proposer and responder about the third-parties’ willingness to pay for a 
right to monitor the negotiations in treatment Purchase in experimental sessions conducted in the UK, but not in 
experimental sessions conducted in Germany does not allow direct comparisons of the behavior of individuals in the 
UK and Germany in treatment Purchase. However, the fact that we do not observe any differences between the 
individuals in the UK and in Germany in any treatment substantiates our interpretation that there are no cultural 
differences between our British and German subjects in this experiment. 
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ECUs. For experimental simplicity, the reward decreases in a linear fashion as the deviation 
increases.
9
  
2.2 Behavioral Predictions  
Assuming selfish preferences, the predictions of standard game theory for our experiment are 
straightforward.
10
 However, years of experimental research supported by behavioral theories 
have shown that people may have manifold motivations and exhibit a variety of behavioral 
biases. Our approach to generate behavioral predictions assumes that having a right to observe 
the negotiation process over distributional outcomes may affect the social distance between 
agents and influence preferences for redistribution. Moreover, we assume that people are 
susceptible to image concerns and may desire to maintain a positive self-image and social 
reputation. 
There is voluminous theoretical and empirical literature documenting the existence of in-group 
favoritism (for instance, Tajfel and Turner, 1979). This in-group favoritism is often expressed in 
the allocation of resources (Turner et al., 1979). Assuming that a right to monitor the decision-
making processes influences participants’ perceived membership in a group and strengthens the 
bond linking the third-party to the proposer and responder, we would expect that third-party 
presence during the negotiations increases allocations to the third-party.   
Theories suggesting that people may desire to maintain a comfortable self-image and positive 
social reputation offer a complementary alternative to predict the impact of third-party 
monitoring in our experiment. If people attach non-negligible value to their self-image 
(Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Konow, 2000; Bénabou and Tirole, 
2006; Dana et al., 2007; Krupka and Weber, 2009) or act based on a wish to be perceived as pro-
social persons (Ireland 1994; Bernheim 1994; Glazer and Konrad, 1996; Bénabou and Tirole, 
2006; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Ariely et al. 2009; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009), we 
would expect that these concerns may influence participants’ behavior in our experiment. In 
particular, if the knowledge of being monitored by a third-party affects the image concerns of the 
                                                             
9 Among different scoring rules, for example, the family of quadratic scoring rule offers incentive compatible 
alternatives for a linear rule. However, the practical implementation of quadratic scoring rules in complex decision 
environments is a challenge (see e.g. Read, 2005).  
10 We acknowledge that game theory itself makes no assumptions about the nature of individuals’ preferences. 
Assuming different preferences may lead to different equilibria and predict differences in behavior between our 
experimental treatments. 
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proposer and responder, we would expect that they allocate more resources to a third-party in a 
treatment where third-parties have an exogenously granted right to monitor the negotiation 
process than in a treatment where there is no opportunity to monitor the negotiation process. 
Thus, we summarize the expected impact of an exogenously granted right to monitor the 
negotiations between the proposer and responder on resource allocations as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: An exogenously granted right to observe the negotiations increases proposed 
allocations to third-parties relative to the Baseline. 
While Hypothesis 1 focuses on the aggregate effect of exogenous third-party monitoring on 
proposed allocations, treatments Purchase and Purchase-other enable  to investigate the effect of 
endogenous monitoring opportunities on proposed allocations. In particular, if proposers react to 
third-party monitoring by increasing their proposed allocations and believe that a sufficiently 
large number of third-parties is willing to acquire a right to monitor the negotiations, it would be 
expected that the mere possibility of being observed by a third-party influences the allocation of 
resources. However, the aggregate effect of endogenous third-party monitoring on proposed 
allocations depends on proposers’ beliefs about the probability that they are monitored. Thus, it 
can be hypothesized that the effect of endogenous monitoring opportunities on proposed 
allocations is smaller than the effect of an exogenously granted right to monitor the negotiations.      
It can be hypothesized that proposers’ and responders’ beliefs about third-parties’ willingness to 
pay for a right to monitor the negotiations depend on whether a third-party may observe the 
negotiation process between the proposer and responder who decide about the third-party’s 
outcome. In particular, proposers and responders may expect that third-parties who may buy a 
right to observe negotiations between a proposer and responder other than the proposer and 
responder who decide about their pay-off may have a lower willingness to pay for a right to 
observe the negotiations. In this case, it would also be less likely that a third-party is observing 
the negotiations in treatment Purchase-other than in treatment Purchase. Assuming that the 
proposed aggregate allocations are sensitive to the expected presence of third-parties, it would be 
expected that an opportunity to buy a right to monitor the negotiations increases proposed 
allocations to third-parties less in treatment Purchase-other than in treatment Purchase. We 
summarize these considerations as follows: 
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Hypothesis 2A: An opportunity to buy a right to monitor the negotiations increases proposed 
allocations to third-parties relative to the Baseline. 
Hypothesis 2B: An opportunity to buy a right to monitor the negotiations increases proposed 
monetary allocations to third-parties less than an exogenously granted right to monitor the 
negotiations. 
Hypothesis 2C: The effect of endogenous monitoring opportunities on proposed monetary 
allocations is smaller in treatment Purchase-other than in treatment Purchase.  
Hypotheses 1 and 2 focus on the aggregate effect of third-party monitoring on proposed 
allocations, but do not pay direct attention to the behavioral mechanisms that may explain greater 
allocations to third-parties in treatments with monitoring opportunities. However, treatments 
Purchase and Purchase-other enable us to more carefully investigate the behavioral factors that 
may guide the allocation decisions towards third-parties. In treatment Purchase (UK), we elicit 
the beliefs of the proposer and responder about third-parties’ willingness to pay for a right to 
monitor the negotiations. This enables us to investigate the relationship between the beliefs of the 
proposer and responder about third-party presence and proposed monetary allocations. In 
particular, if participants’ social image concerns are negligible, we would expect proposals that 
are independent of proposers’ and responders’ beliefs about third-party presence. However, if a 
wish to be perceived as a pro-social person in the eyes of other agents is an important determinant 
of pro-social behavior in our experiment, we would expect that beliefs over the presence of a 
third-party are associated with the proposed allocations.  
At the same time, the desire to be perceived as a pro-social person in the eyes of others may not 
be independent of the audience. Thus, by means of treatment Purchase-other, we may test 
whether the potential association between the beliefs of the proposer and responder about third-
party presence and proposed monetary allocations is conditional on the identity of the third-party. 
In particular, if the wish to be perceived as a pro-social person in the eyes of those people whose 
pay-off depends on the outcome of the bargaining process is stronger than the wish to be 
perceived as a pro-social person among a more general audience, we would expect that the 
association between the beliefs and proposed resource allocation is stronger in treatment 
Purchase than in treatment Purchase-other. We summarize these considerations as follows:  
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Hypothesis 3A: There is a positive association between the beliefs of the proposer and responder 
about third-party presence and proposed monetary allocations.  
Hypothesis 3B: The association between the beliefs of the proposer and responder about third-
party presence and proposed monetary allocations is stronger in treatment Purchase than in 
treatment Purchase-other.  
As noted earlier, people often have various behavioral motivations beyond their economic self-
interest. The experiment conducted in this study enables to explore whether individuals are 
willing to invest economic resources to monitor negotiations where two other agents bargain over 
outcomes which affect the payoffs of all parties.  
There are numerous potential explanations why a person could be willing to pay for a right to 
monitor negotiations over distributional outcomes. Potential explanations include, for example, a 
preference for curiosity (Loewenstein, 1994), a desire to reduce perceived social distance 
between the agents (Sherif 1958, Leeson 2008) and uncertainty avoidance. An alternative 
explanation for participants’ willingness to pay for a right to observe is to understand the 
monitoring of instant messaging as a consumption good that enables individuals to derive direct 
satisfaction from observing the negotiation process.  
Moreover, treatments Purchase and Purchase-other enable us to explore different motivations 
that may guide participants’ decisions to purchase a right to monitor the negotiations. In 
particular, we have designed the treatment Purchase to investigate whether participants attach 
particular value for a right to observe negotiations which determine their own economic outcome. 
At the same time, the treatment Purchase-other enables us to examine whether our participants 
are willing to pay for a right to observe the negotiation process between a proposer and responder 
who do not determine their payoffs. By comparing participants’ willingness to pay in treatments 
Purchase and Purchase-other, we examine whether participants are willing to pay for a chance to 
actively reduce the uncertainty concerning their own monetary outcome. If participants attach 
particular value to a chance to reduce uncertainty concerning their own monetary outcome, we 
would expect that there is greater willingness to pay for a right to observe negotiations in 
treatment Purchase than in treatment Purchase-other. We summarize these considerations as 
follows:  
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Hypothesis 4A: There is a positive willingness to pay for a right to observe the negotiations. 
Hypothesis 4B: There is greater willingness to pay for a right to observe negotiations when 
third-parties observe the negotiation process between the proposer and responder who bargain 
over third-parties’ own outcome than when third-parties observe the negotiation process between 
any other proposer and responder. 
In treatments Purchase and Purchase-other, the proposer and responder are aware that a third-
party may monitor their negotiations, but they cannot verify the potential presence of a third-
party. However, in treatment Signal the proposer and responder are informed whether a third-
party is monitoring their negotiations. Consequently, third-parties may deliberately decide to 
signal their presence during the negotiations. In this case, a greater willingness to pay for a right 
to observe the negotiations can be justified by pecuniary incentives if third-parties believe that 
their presence changes distributional outcomes for their own benefit. There are multiple 
behavioral mechanisms that may lead third-parties to believe that their presence changes 
distributional outcomes for their benefit. Particularly noteworthy mechanisms include the 
reduction of social distance and increasing the need to be perceived as pro-social persons among 
the proposers and responders. However, our experiment is not designed to investigate the 
potential factors that may lead third-parties to believe that their presence changes distributional 
outcomes for their benefit. By contrast, we simply hypothesize that a chance of signaling 
presence during negotiations at large increases the willingness to pay for a right to monitor 
negotiations over distributional outcomes. 
 
Hypothesis 5: There is greater willingness to pay for a right to observe negotiations when third-
parties can signal their presence during the negotiations.  
2.3 Experimental Procedure  
A total of 384 subjects (219 women, 165 men) participated in 19 different sessions (10 in 
Germany and 9 in the UK) in the experiment. The number of participants per session varied from 
12 to 27 participants. The experimental sessions were conducted at the laboratories of the Max 
Planck Institute of Economics in Germany and of the University of East Anglia in the UK. The 
experiment was programmed and run using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants were mainly 
undergraduate students (Mean age: 22.5 years, Min: 18, Max: 55, Standard deviation: 3.9) from a 
  
14 
 
wide range of academic disciplines. Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants were randomly 
assigned to their cubicles preventing communication and visual interaction. They were given 
detailed instructions and a number of quiz questions on paper. After the subjects had familiarized 
themselves with the rules of the game by reading the instructions, the experimenter ensured that 
the rules of the game were common information by reading aloud a detailed summary of the 
instructions. Subjects then took a post instruction quiz and were not allowed to continue until all 
answers were correct. Participants were paid after the experiment privately in cash according to 
their earnings from the experiment. On average, the experiment lasted for 30 minutes. Earnings in 
ECUs were converted to Euro or Pounds at an exchange rate of 1:1. Average earnings in 
Germany were 12.83€ including a show-up fee of 2.50€. Average earnings in the UK were 
£12.17 including a show-up fee of £2. 
III. Results 
The main scientific objective of this paper is to identify characteristic patterns of economic 
decision-making under third-party surveillance. As noted in Section 2, this study includes data 
from experiments conducted in Germany and in the United Kingdom. Existing empirical 
evidence suggests that there may be systematic differences in the behavior of subjects across 
different societies (Roth et al., 1991; Henrich et al., 2001; Herrmann et. al, 2008). Hence, we first 
test for differences in behavior between the two geographic locations. We do not find significant 
differences between the locations.
11
 As a result, we combine the data collected in these two 
locations for treatments Baseline and Purchase. Furthermore, the fact that we do not find 
significant differences between the two locations enables us to compare the treatment Purchase-
other with other treatments regardless of where the treatments were conducted.  
3.1 The impact of third-party surveillance on proposed resource allocations 
We first investigate the impact of third-party surveillance on proposed resource allocations. 
Notably, the acceptance rate of proposed allocations was 100 percent in all treatments conducted 
in Germany. In the UK, one responder did not accept the proposal in treatment Baseline. 
Likewise, one responder did not accept the proposal in treatment Purchase in the UK. These 
                                                             
11 The only significant difference we find between the two locations is in the optimism of third-parties. Third-parties 
in the UK expect to receive significantly higher earnings than third-parties in Germany. A detailed analysis of the 
location effects is made available in the Electronic Supplementary Material.  
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observations suggest that the proposer and the responder regularly come to an agreement during 
the negotiation process and implement an allocation that is almost always accepted by the 
responder.   
Table 2. Proposed average and median allocations to the receiver and 
third-party by treatment.  
  Allocation to  
Responder (ECUs) 
Allocation to 
 third-party (ECUs) 
Treatment N Mean 
 
Median 
 
Std. 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Std. 
Baseline 31 11.65 12.00 1.70 4.94 5.00 3.52 
        
Observation 25 11.36 11.00 1.68 4.48 5.00 2.86 
        
Purchase 31 11.45 12.00 2.14 4.77 5.00 3.28 
        
Purchase-other 17 11.35 11.00 1.46 5.06 5.00 3.09 
        
Signal – Obs. 8 11.75 12.00 1.49 4.50 5.00 2.26 
        
Signal – No Obs. 16 11.75 11.50 1.88 3.19 3.00 2.66 
Note: Each participant acting as a proposer generates one observation. N = Number of 
observations. Std. = Standard deviation. Obs. = Third-party observes the course of 
negotiations, No – Obs. = Third-party does not observe the course of negotiations.  
 
Table 2 presents average allocations by proposers to responders and third-parties in each 
treatment.
12
 Furthermore, in treatment Signal, we distinguish between the situations where a 
third-party has successfully acquired a right to observe the negotiations and where a third-party 
has missed an option to purchase a right to observe the negotiations. We find that third-party 
surveillance does not affect proposed resource allocations. A Kruskal-Wallis test shows that, 
overall, there are no significant differences in the proposed allocations to third-parties across the 
treatments (p = 0.5367).
13
  
 
 
                                                             
12 Table 2 presents average allocations proposed by the proposer taking into account the effect of rejected proposals. 
Results presented in Tables 2 and 3 are robust to the exclusion of rejected proposals. 
13
 There are also no significant differences in allocations to the proposer (p = 0.2530) and to the responder (p = 
0.9117). 
  
16 
 
Table 3. Allocations to the third-parties: Pairwise comparisons of 
treatments, p-values of Mann-Whitney tests. 
  
Observation Purchase 
Signal – 
Obs. 
Signal – 
No Obs. 
Purchase-
other 
Baseline 0.635 0.779 0.633 0.102
 
0.991 
Observation - 0.783 1.000 0.153
 
0.579 
Purchase - - 0.696 0.117
 
0.869 
Signal – Obs. - - - 0.204 0.679 
Signal – No Obs. - - - - 0.064 
Note: Obs. = Third-party observes the course of negotiations, No – Obs. = Third-party does not 
observe the course of negotiations.   
Table 3 shows the p-values for two-sided Mann-Whitney tests that compare allocations to the 
third-parties across all pairs of treatments. Overall, Table 3 shows that there are no significant 
differences in offers made to the third-parties between any two treatments.
14
 In particular, we find 
that an exogenously imposed third-party surveillance in treatment Observation does not affect 
proposed resource allocation compared to the treatment where there is no possibility to observe 
the negotiations (Baseline) (Mann-Whitney test: p = 0.635). This gives our first result.  
Result 1: Compared to the Baseline, an exogenously granted right to observe the negotiations 
does not affect proposed allocations to third-parties.  
Likewise, an opportunity to buy the right to monitor negotiations in treatments Purchase, 
Purchase-other and Signal does not increase proposed allocations relative to those in the Baseline 
(p > 0.10 in all cases). This is also the case when the proposer and responder are aware of third-
party presence (Signal – Obs.). Furthermore, allocations to the third-parties in treatment 
Observation and in other treatments with endogenous observation are not significantly different 
from each other. Finally, allocations to third-parties in treatment Purchase-other are not 
                                                             
14 The only significant difference (at the 10% level) is between Purchase-other and Signal – No Obs. In this case, a 
third-party receives a lower amount when the proposer and responder know that a third-party is not observing in 
contrast to a situation where a third-party can at best observe the discussion in some other group. If we combine the 
observations Signal – Obs. and Signal – No Obs. we get 24 observations for the treatment Signal. In this case, none 
of the pairwise differences is statistically significant. We note that the statistical inference here may suffer from 
multiple comparisons problem. If we apply the Holm-Bonferroni correction to account for multiple comparisons, 
none of the comparisons is statistically significant at the 10 % level. 
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significantly different from those in treatment Purchase (p = 0.869). Thus, we do not find any 
evidence in support of Hypothesis 2.  
Result 2A: Compared to the Baseline, an opportunity to buy a right to observe negotiations does 
not affect allocations to the third-party.  
Result 2B: Allocations to the third-party are unaffected by whether a right to observe 
negotiations is exogenously granted or endogenously determined by the third-party.  
Result 2C: Allocations to the third-party are unaffected by which group the third-party can 
observe.  
Results 1 and 2 suggest that third-party surveillance does not affect proposed resource 
allocations. The fact that the proposed allocations to the third-parties are not greater in treatments 
Observation and Signal than in treatment Baseline is an indicator of the perceived irrelevance of 
third-party presence in the decision-making process of the proposer and responder. However, in 
treatments Purchase and Purchase-other, the proposer and responder do not know whether a 
third-party is present. In the face of this uncertainty, it is expected that the proposer and 
responder form beliefs about third-party presence. Despite the fact that there are no differences in 
proposed allocations between the treatments, it is possible that offers to third-parties are sensitive 
to such beliefs about the presence of a third-party. 
To explore this possibility, we elicited the beliefs of the proposer and responder about third-
parties’ maximum willingness to pay for a right to observe the communication in treatments 
Purchase and Purchase-other.
15
 Table 4 presents proposers’ and responders’ average estimates 
about third-parties’ willingness to pay (WTP) for a right to observe the communication in these 
two treatments. For reference, we also present the third-parties’ actual average willingness to pay 
in these treatments. Additionally, Table 4 also presents Mann-Whitney tests (z-stats and p-values, 
two-sided) comparing the estimates of the proposer and responder with the third-parties’ actual 
WTP by treatment.  
 
                                                             
15
As described in Section 2, we elicit the beliefs of the proposer and responder about third-parties’ maximum 
willingness to pay in treatment Purchase only in experimental sessions conducted in the United Kingdom.  
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Table 4. Mean estimates of third-parties maximum willingness to pay (ECUs). 
 
 Estimate by M-W tests 
 Treatment 
Third-party 
WTP 
Proposer Responder Proposer Responder 
Purchase 0.87 1.46 1.68 1.560 2.053 
 
(0.80) (1.12) (0.77) [0.1187] [0.0400] 
Purchase-other 0.78 1.49 1.57 2.688 2.459 
 
(0.85) (1.08) (0.95) [0.0072] [0.0139] 
Note: Number of observations in treatment Purchase = 14 and in treatment Purchase-other = 17. 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. Figures in brackets are p-values.  
Table 4 shows that the proposer and responder over-estimate third-parties’ willingness to pay in 
both treatments. Mann-Whitney test statistics show that the responders significantly over-
estimate third-parties’ willingness to pay in treatment Purchase, while both the proposer and the 
responder significantly over-estimate third-parties’ willingness to pay in treatment Purchase-
other. However, we find that the beliefs of the proposer and responder about the third-party 
presence are not associated with the proposed allocations. The Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient between the proposers’ estimates of the third-parties’ maximum 
willingness to pay and the proposed allocations to third-parties is -0.1220 (p = 0.6777, two-sided) 
in treatment Purchase and -0.354 (p = 0.163, two-sided) in treatment Purchase-other. The 
correlation between the responders’ estimates of the third-parties’ maximum willingness to pay 
and the proposed allocation to the third-parties is 0.057 (p = 0.845, two-sided) in treatment 
Purchase and -0.209 (p = 0.423, two-sided) in treatment Purchase-other. We take these 
observations as evidence that the beliefs of the proposer and responder about the third-party 
presence are not associated with the proposed resource allocations.  
Result 3: The proposer and responder over-estimate third-parties’ willingness to pay for a right 
to observe the negotiations. However, the beliefs of the proposer and responder about third-party 
presence are not associated with the proposed resource allocations.
 16
 
                                                             
16
 It is conceivable that the impact of third-party surveillance is not limited to proposed resource allocations, but 
affects the very process of negotiating an agreeable outcome. An analysis of the average length of negotiations in 
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3.2 Demand for a right to observe the negotiation process 
In the following, we investigate the demand for a right to observe the negotiation process. Figure 
1 shows the percentage of individuals in treatments Purchase, Purchase-other and Signal who 
are willing to purchase a right to observe the course of negotiations between the proposer and 
responder at each price.
17
 We find that a substantial fraction of third-parties is willing to pay for a 
right to observe the communication at a positive price. For example, when the right to observe 
can be acquired at the price of 0.50 ECUs, 68 percent of the individuals in treatment Purchase are 
willing to purchase an access to the negotiation records. Overall, the average willingness to pay is 
0.93 ECUs in treatment Signal, 0.87 ECUs in treatment Purchase and 0.78 ECUs in treatment 
Purchase-other. Wilcoxon Signed-rank tests confirm that the average willingness to pay is 
significantly greater than zero (p < 0.001, two-sided) in all three treatments.  
Result 4: On average, third-parties have a positive willingness to pay for a right to observe the 
negotiations between the proposer and responder. 
Figure 1 shows that the demand for a right to observe is downward-sloping. The percentage of 
individuals willing to pay for the information decreases as the price increases. Figure 1 
documents that the demand becomes weak when the price is 2 ECUs or above. Finally, in all 
three treatments, there is not a single individual who is willing to pay the maximum price of 5 
ECUs for a right to observe the negotiations.  
 
[Figure 1 about here.] 
 Figure 1. Third-parties’ willingness to pay to observe the communication. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
each treatment is reported in the Electronic Supplementary Material. We find that third-party surveillance does not 
affect the length of the negotiation period between the proposer and responder. 
17 We presented to the participants a price list as described in Section 2.1 and asked them to indicate if they would be 
willing to observe the negotiations at each price. We find that there were 20 participants (28 percent) who submitted 
‘incomplete’ price lists. While these participants indicated the highest price they would be willing to pay, they did 
not indicate that they would be willing to pay any or some of the lower prices. Here, we adopt a convention that the 
highest indicated price is an individual’s maximum willingness to pay and include these individuals in our analysis. 
We also analyze the willingness to pay after excluding individuals with incomplete price lists. These results are 
reported in the Electronic Supplementary Material. Excluding individuals with incomplete price lists does not change 
our findings.  
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In Table 5, we report random-effects logistic regression coefficients for a probability to purchase 
a right to observe. As expected, these models show that the probability to purchase is negatively 
related to price. At the same time, the reported models enable us to investigate the impact of 
participants’ beliefs about their own outcome on their willingness to pay for a right to observe. In 
Figure 1, we observe that a certain fraction of individuals is willing to forego a right to observe 
the negotiations even at a zero price. In addition, about 20 percent of the individuals are willing 
to pay no more than 0.20 ECUs for a right to observe the negotiations. Are these individuals who 
decide to forego a chance to monitor the negotiations at low prices systematically different from 
the individuals who are willing to pay a higher price for a right to observe? One potential 
explanation is that individuals who expect to receive only a small fraction of the available 
resources are more willing to remain ignorant about the course of negotiations to avoid observing 
how the responder and receiver ignore fairness considerations towards these individuals. The 
regression coefficients in Table 5, however, do not lend support to this conjecture. We find that 
expectations about the negotiators’ benevolence towards the third-party do not impact third-
parties’ willingness to purchase information about the course of negotiations in any of the three 
treatments. Moreover, we do not find any impact of demographic factors on third-parties’ 
willingness to pay. All reported results are robust to the inclusion of location and session specific 
fixed effects. 
Table 5.  Factors determining the probability of purchasing a right to 
observe – Random Effects Logit. 
 
Probability of Purchasing a Right to Observe – Random Effects Logit 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Price 
 
-2.208*** 
(.374) 
-1.889*** 
(.126) 
-1.863*** 
(.442) 
    
Belief 
 
 0.126 
(.085) 
0.135 
(.091) 
 
Price x Belief 
 
  
-0.043 
(.060) 
 
-0.047 
(.054) 
    
Constant 1.860** 
(.874) 
1.125 
(.976) 
1.869 
(1.860) 
Demographic Controls 
Session fixed effects 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
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Observations 576 576 576 
Number of subjects 72 72 72 
Log likelihood -193.85 -192.87 -192.50 
Prob > χ2 < 0.000 < 0.000 < 0.000 
Note: Random-effects logit coefficients. Numbers in parentheses indicate robust standard 
errors clustered at an individual level. All models include session fixed effects. Model 3 
includes demographic control variables. Demographic variables include Age, Gender and 
Language (Native German or English speaker / Other native language). ***Significant at 
1%, **Significant at 5%.  
 
Result 5: The fraction of third-parties who are willing to observe the communication is 
decreasing in price. However, third-parties’ willingness to pay for a right to observe the 
negotiations between the proposer and responder is not associated with their beliefs about their 
own outcome. 
Finally, Figure 1 suggests that there are only modest differences between treatments in third-
parties’ willingness to pay for a right to observe the negotiations. Pairwise non-parametric tests 
confirm this impression. Mann-Whitney tests show that third-parties’ willingness to pay does not 
significantly differ across treatments (p > 0.50 for all pairwise comparisons, two-sided).  
Result 6. Third-parties’ willingness to pay does not differ between the situations where they can 
observe the communication in their own group and where they can observe the communication in 
some other group.   
Result 7. Third-parties’ willingness to pay does not depend on the possibility to signal their 
presence during the negotiations.  
3.3 Beliefs and earnings of third-parties    
We have observed that a large fraction of individuals is willing to pay for a right to observe the 
negotiation process despite the fact that surveillance does not affect resource allocation. Yet, an 
equally policy-relevant question is whether people believe that their presence during the 
negotiations affects distributional outcomes. Even though we do not have formal hypotheses 
concerning people’s beliefs about the impact of their presence, we conduct an ex-post analysis of 
the relationship between third-parties’ beliefs and their outcomes.   
Table 6 reports summary statistics about third-parties’ beliefs by treatment and non-parametric 
test statistics based on a comparison between the reported beliefs and empirically observed actual 
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distributions reported in Table 2. First, when comparing third-parties’ beliefs with the empirically 
observed distributional outcomes, we find that the third-parties are systematically over-optimistic 
about their own outcome.
18
 Second, we observe that third-parties are most over-optimistic about 
their own outcome in treatment Signal where they have a chance to signal their presence to the 
negotiators. This qualitative observation is confirmed by testing the differences in third-parties’ 
expectations about their outcome and empirically observed actual outcomes across treatments. 
We find that the third-parties are more over-optimistic about their own outcome in treatment 
Signal than in treatments Baseline (Mann-Whitney test: p < 0.01, two-sided), Observation 
(Mann-Whitney test: p < 0.01, two-sided), Purchase (Mann-Whitney test: p < 0.01, two-sided) 
and Purchase-other (Mann-Whitney test: p = 0.114, two-sided). We take this as evidence that 
third-parties are most over-optimistic about their own outcome when they have a chance to signal 
their presence to the negotiators. 
Table 6. Expected average allocations to the responder and third-party by 
treatment. 
 Expected Allocation to 
responder (ECUs) 
Expected Allocation to 
 third-party (ECUs) 
 
Treatment 
 
Mean 
 
Std. 
 
Difference 
 
Mean 
 
Std. 
 
Difference 
Baseline 10.94 2.02 -0.71 6.68 3.44 1.74
*
 
       
Observation 10.72 2.48 -0.64
* 
6.16 3.34 1.68
* 
       
Purchase 11.16 2.05 -0.29 6.19 3.97 1.42 
       
Purchase-other 10.82 1.74 -0.52 7.59 3.16 2.53
**
 
       
Signal 10.63 1.91 -1.12
*
 7.21 3.43 3.58
***
 
Note: Variable Difference is defined as a difference between the reported beliefs about proposed 
allocations and the empirically observed actual average allocations. Number of observations in 
Baseline = 31, in Observation = 25, in Purchase = 31, in Purchase-other = 17 and in Signal = 24. 
Asterisks indicate the significance of Mann-Whitney test statistics based on a comparison between 
the reported beliefs and empirically observed actual distributions. ***Significant at 1%, **Significant 
at 5%, *Significant at 10%.  
 
                                                             
18 It is noteworthy that in treatments Baseline and Observation, where there is no option to acquire a right to observe 
the negotiations, participants acting as third-parties are only requested to report their expectations about the 
proposers’ behavior. In other words, reporting the expectations about the distributional outcomes is the only active 
decision made by the third-parties during the experiment. Consequently, it is not possible that the reported beliefs are 
biased due to hedging strategies. 
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Result 9: Third-parties are over-optimistic about their own outcome. Third-parties are most 
over-optimistic about their own outcome when they have a chance to signal their presence to the 
negotiators. 
IV. Concluding remarks 
People repeatedly demand greater transparency of decision-making from their governments and 
other bodies of decision-making. Information about the decision-making processes is considered 
to be essential to hold governments to account, to maintain integrity in the public sector and to 
guarantee a level playing field for enterprises. Despite large public interest to facilitate the 
openness of decision-making on various scales, there have been no consistent attempts to study 
the impact of transparency on people’s distributional preferences over outcomes. This paper aims 
to begin to fill this gap by reporting an experiment that adds an inactive third-party to an 
economic bargaining game and endows this person with a right to observe other individuals’ pre-
play communication. Moreover, we implement various treatments which offer opportunities to 
purchase surveillance rights to examine what motivates individuals to invest economic resources 
to monitor decision-making processes. 
There are three key findings. First, we find no evidence that the knowledge of being under 
surveillance influences distributional outcomes. Second, a large majority of individuals is willing 
to pay for a right to monitor decision-making processes over distributional outcomes despite 
pecuniary incentives to the contrary. Third, we observe that third-parties are over-confident in 
believing that an opportunity to scrutinize decision-making processes changes distributional 
outcomes for their own benefit.  
The procedures used in this experiment to model economic decision-making and third-party 
monitoring are stylized versions of naturally-occurring decision-making processes. It needs to be 
acknowledged that a decision to buy a right to monitor the decision-making process in our 
experiment has only limited absolute monetary consequences to third-parties which may limit the 
inferences that can be drawn from our study. Likewise, we cannot completely exclude the 
possibility that participants are willing to pay for a right to monitor the negotiations due to cues 
about what constitutes appropriate behavior in our experiment (see, for instance, Zizzo, 2010). 
However, we find that the vast majority of participants report a monotonically decreasing 
willingness to observe as the price increases. This observation suggests that participants at least 
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carefully consider their decisions when indicating their highest willingness to pay and that their 
decisions are influenced also by factors other than cues about what constitutes appropriate 
behavior in our experiment. 
In our experiment, all participants are anonymous to each other and cannot be personally 
identified. Hence, our experiment implements a remarkably weak form of third-party monitoring. 
Third-parties rarely act in isolation in naturally-occurring situations and are as powerless as the 
third-parties in our experiment. The ubiquity of word-of-mouth networks and opportunities to 
make private knowledge available to large audiences through media may heighten the value of 
information gained through third-party monitoring and affect the consequences of third-party 
surveillance. Likewise, third-parties’ rank in a social hierarchy and centrality in a social network 
may influence the effect of third-party surveillance in naturally-occurring situations. For instance, 
Breza et al. (2015) find in their lab-in-the-field experiment that surveillance by high-centrality 
third-parties has substantially larger impact on trust game outcomes than surveillance by third-
parties with low ranks in the centrality distribution. These observations overall indicate that the 
highly stylized and anonymous decision environment applied in this study may attenuate the 
impact of third-party monitoring on distributional outcomes.  
Despite the limitations of our study, we observe certain characteristic patterns of economic 
decisions-making that may provide insight into the effects of third-party monitoring on the 
allocation of economic resources. One possible interpretation of our results is that the electronic 
monitoring of decision-making processes in an anonymous setting does not reduce the social 
distance between the agents to an extent that is necessary to influence resource allocations. 
Another possible interpretation is that the decision to monitor the decision-making process may 
be seen by the negotiators as an attempt to control their actions. Consequently, it is possible that 
proposers and responders perceive surveillance as a signal of distrust, leading to resentment and 
less pro-social behavior (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006). Likewise, the fact that third-parties are over-
confident in believing that an opportunity to monitor decision-making processes changes 
distributional outcomes for their own benefit may be relevant to understand the rationale behind 
the persistent demands for more transparent decision-making. However, it is difficult to judge 
whether the tendency to over-estimate the effect of transparent decision-making on economic 
outcomes reflects a stable cognitive bias that is replicable in other environments or is just an 
experimental artifact inherent to the design of our study. The robustness of our results and their 
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external relevance has to be further studied before we can begin to make forceful arguments 
about the generalizability of our results. 
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Highlights: 
- We investigate how transparency influences preferences over distributional outcomes.  
- We enable third-parties to observe negotiations between two other individuals. 
- Third-party surveillance does not affect outcomes in a three-person ultimatum game. 
- Individuals may over-estimate the effect of transparent decision-making on economic outcomes. 
 
